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"POLITICAL" INFLUENCE AT THE FCC
RICHARD E. WILEY*
In March of 1974, when I assumed the Chairmanship of the FCC,
relations between the Nixon administration and the nation's leading
news organizations were, to say the least, extremely poor. White House
insiders reportedly viewed much of the media establishment as "the en-
emy" and administration spokesmen regularly expressed sharp criticism
of what they viewed as a strong anti-administration bias on the part of
journalists. The statements of Vice President Agnew were particularly
colorful in their attacks on Walter Cronkite, John Chancellor and other
"effete intellectual snobs."' In some cases, such criticism was explicitly
linked to threats of governmental retaliation against the media.
For example, presidential assistant Patrick Buchanan publicly stated
that a 1972 bill that would have increased funding for public television
was vetoed because the individuals and programs appearing on PBS were
considered to oppose the administration. 2 Similarly, a White House offi-
cial took direct aim at the three commercial television networks. In a
speech delivered to the Indianapolis chapter of Sigma Delta Chi, Dr.
Clay T. Whitehead, the director of the President's Office of Telecommu-
nications Policy, stated that broadcasters had a duty to avoid "ideologi-
cal plugola" in their newscasts and to correct the situation where "so-
called professionals.., dispense elitist gossip in the guise of news analy-
sis."'3 Dr. Whitehead went on to state:
Station managers and network officials who fail to act to correct
imbalance or consistent bias from the networks-or who acquiesce by
silence-can only be considered willing participants, to be held fully
accountable by the broadcaster's community at license renewal time.4
This warning understandably sent tremors of apprehension through
the broadcast community and provoked intense criticism of Dr. White-
head by the press and by the Democratic leadership in Congress.
* Former Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, 1974-1977. Senior partner, Wi-
ley, Rein & Fielding, Washington, D.C.
1. See Friendly, The Campaign to Politicize Broadcasting, I I COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Mar.-Apr, 1973, at 9, 10.
2. Phillips, Killian Sees Watergate as Helping Public TV, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1973, at L31,
col. 2. Mr. Buchanan was especially critical of Sander Vanocur, Robert MacNeil, Elizabeth Drew,
Bill Moyers, "Washington Week in Review" and "Black Journal"; he suggested that William F.
Buckley had been thrown into the PBS schedule as a "figleaf."
3. W. PORTER, ASSAULT ON THE MEDIA: THE NIXON YEARS 303, 304 (1976).
4. Id. at 304.
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As a consequence of these developments, my colleagues and I at the
FCC became acutely aware of the fact that Congress expected us to es-
chew any attempts that might be undertaken by the executive branch to
improperly influence our actions. Of course, those who were familiar
with the FCC's policies knew that, notwithstanding Dr. Whitehead's
comments, there was no danger that the Commission would take retalia-
tory action against the broadcast media. As Fred Friendly stated at the
time:
The FCC, under chairman Burch as well as his predecessors, has con-
sistently stressed that news "bias"-in the Whitehead sense-is never
taken into account by the agency at renewal time. Indeed, the Com-
mission will not even consider a charge in this field unless there is in-
dependent extrinsic evidence of news slanting by top management.5
Nevertheless, in light of the public and congressional outcry over the
issue, we were extremely anxious to avoid circumstances that would cre-
ate even the appearance that the agency was subject to improper execu-
tive branch influence.
For this reason, I was very concerned to learn, upon assuming the
office of Chairman, that one of my first official duties would be to re-
spond to a congressional inquiry into allegations that the executive
branch had assumed "control" of appointments to career service posi-
tions within the FCC. Congressional investigators informed us that the
White House had maintained a program of forwarding numerous refer-
rals of "politically acceptable" job applicants to the various departments
and agencies-including the independent agencies. I wanted to be cer-
tain that the integrity of the agency's career employee service had not
been compromised by such a referral program. However, when my staff
completed its examination of the relevant personal memoranda and files,
what we found was merely an amusing example of an elaborate program
of job referrals that was almost entirely ineffectual.
These records indicated that, out of over one hundred executive re-
ferrals to the FCC (in categories marked by the White House as either a
"courtesy referral," a "priority referral" or a "must hire"), just one ap-
plicant had actually been hired by the agency. Since that individual's
name had been forwarded as merely a courtesy referral (and he held a
relatively low-level job for a mere six months before leaving the agency),
it was obvious that the FCC's personnel department effectively had re-
jected White House "priority" and "must hire" referrals. When these
results were reported to the oversight committee, our staff offered to con-
duct a similar survey of job referrals that had been sent to the agency
from Capitol Hill and assured the investigators that congressional refer-
5. Friendly, supra note 1, at 16.
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rals likely would represent a much larger number of actual hires. The
oversight committee investigator immediately responded that they had
no interest in such a survey and, for all intents and purposes, that was the
end of the matter.
This little episode illustrates what has long been apparent to those
who have worked in policymaking positions at the FCC: while public
discussion of agency "independence" usually focuses on allegations of
improper White House influence, the most powerful and persistent
"political" influence over the Commission clearly originates with the
congressional appropriations and oversight committees and with other
important members of the legislature. This fact is perhaps best illus-
trated by the famous story of Newton Minow's courtesy visit with House
Speaker Sam Rayburn shortly after Minow's appointment as Chairman
of the Commission. During this meeting,
"Mr. Sam" put his arm around the new FCC Chairman and said,
"Just remember one thing, son. Your agency is an arm of the Con-
gress; you belong to us. Remember that and you'll be all right." The
Speaker went on to warn him to expect a lot of trouble and pressure,
but, as Minow recalls, "what he did not tell me was that most of the
pressure would come from the Congress itself.'' 6
It is not difficult to understand why Congress, rather than the Presi-
dent, is the most significant political influence on the FCC's actions and
policies. In their excellent book entitled The Politics of Broadcast Regu-
lation, Messrs. Krasnow, Longley and Terry correctly state that congres-
sional strategies for overseeing FCC activity cover a wide range of
alternatives, including control by statute, the power of the purse, the
"spur" of investigation, the power of advice and consent over the ap-
pointment of commissioners, the continuing oversight of standing com-
mittees, supervision by multiple committees, and pressures from
individual members and congressional staff representatives. 7 Anyone
who has served as Chairman of the FCC is well aware of the fact that
Senators and Representatives use these supervisory tools with great regu-
6. E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 89
(3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter E. KRASNOW] (footnotes omitted). Other observers have shared Chair-
man Minow's sense of irony when contemplating the notion that "agencies should be insulated from
partisan politics by subordinating them to Congress instead of subordinating them to the President!"
Eg., I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2:9, at 91 (2d ed. 1978). Nevertheless, as has
been the case with other "independent agencies," a majority in Congress concluded that it was desir-
able to limit Executive power over the FCC and that this objective could best be achieved by giving
the Commissioners fixed terms in office. See 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
7. E. KRASNOW, supra note 6, at 87-132. The existence of these supervisory powers is, of
course, fully consistent with the constitutional role of the Congress and with democratic principles.
Indeed, in cases that do not involve adjudication or other similarly sensitive matters, it is both appro-
priate and desirable that the Commissioners be in touch with officials of government who are politi-
cally accountable.
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larity and enthusiasm. As Newton Minow has stated, "When I was
Chairman, I heard from the Congress about as frequently as television
commercials flash across the television screen.
'
"
8
In contrast, the President and other top leaders of the executive
branch rarely have the time or inclination to speak with FCC Commis-
sioners about the day-to-day work of their agency. As a consequence,
the administration's oversight of communications policy is typically the
responsibility of mid-level officials who are somewhat removed from the
center of the executive branch's real "political" power. 9
To find a really clear-cut allegation of an improper executive branch
attempt to influence FCC actions, one would probably have to go back to
the Roosevelt administration.10 Unlike some of his successors, President
Roosevelt had an intense personal interest in policy decisions at the
Commission. According to University of Texas Professor Lucas Powe,
Roosevelt was offended by the fact that he had been opposed by the vast
majority of the newspapers in the United States and developed as his
"number-one priority" a plan to retaliate by stripping newspaper owners
of the ability to hold broadcasting licenses.I1 After Roosevelt appointed
James Lawrence Fly to head the FCC, he sent the new Chairman a one-
8. N. MINOW, EQUAL TIME: THE PRIvATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 36
(1964).
9. Today, this function is carried out in the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA), which is a part of the Department of Commerce. During the Nixon and
Ford administrations, such work was the responsibility of the Office of Telecommunications Policy
(OTP), which was then a unit located in the White House. But even with the former White House
location, FCC Chairman Burch testified before Congress that he had "absolutely no fear of either an
actual or possible undue influence by the White House on the Commission by virtue of this office."
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1970: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Executive and Legislative
Reorganization of the House Government Operations Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1970).
Based on my own experience with both OTP and NTIA, I fully share Chairman Burch's assessment
that there is little danger that either of these offices would improperly influence FCC actions.
10. While there is little evidence that President Roosevelt's successors sought to directly influ-
ence the FCC's decisionmaking process, there have been instances where they have utilized the
agency's procedures in ways that are, at a minimum, highly questionable. In the mid-1960s, in
response to criticism of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations by "right-wing" radio commenta-
tors, the Democratic party mounted a campaign of sending "fairness doctrine" complaints to many
small rural radio stations in an apparently successful attempt to discourage these stations from car-
rying programs that the party found to be objectionable. See F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE
BAD Guys AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 32-42 (1976). During the Nixon administration, friends
of the President filed competing license applications in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to strip
the Washington Post of its television stations in Florida (the Post was the most prominent newspaper
involved in early investigative reporting of the "Watergate" scandal). See L. POwE, AMERICAN
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 121-132 (1987). However, I can personally attest to
the fact that there were no White House contacts with the FCC in connection with the filings against
the Washington Post stations and, so far as I am aware, no such contacts occurred in the case of the
Democratic party's attack on "right-wing" radio programming in the 1960s.
11. See generally L. PowE, supra note 10, at 68-74.
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sentence memorandum that clearly conveyed his interest in this issue:
"Will you let me know when you propose to have a hearing on newspa-
per ownership of radio stations."1 2 Soon thereafter, the agency an-
nounced that it was initiating a broad-ranging notice of rulemaking
looking into the matter of the ownership of radio stations by persons who
were associated with newspapers. 13 Fortunately for the newspapers (and
also for those of us who care about first amendment "niceties"), the
Commission abandoned this rulemaking after several years, noting the
"grave legal and policy questions involved." 14
We should not be surprised at the general absence of evidence of the
kind of executive branch communications to the FCC exemplified by this
episode. The questionable nature of such communications makes it un-
likely that they would be disclosed to the public by the participants.
Nevertheless, having had personal knowledge of the views and the char-
acter of every FCC Commissioner who has served during the past 20
years, I cannot believe that any of these men and women would have
taken instructions from the White House, especially in a politically-
charged area that is fraught with extremely serious first amendment
implications.15
Of course, such a personal "testimonial" does not provide a basis for
lowering our guard against improper political influence at the FCC-
from whatever source. The FCC deals with a wide variety of issues that
are of enormous importance to the mass media. All too often these deci-
sions are resolved under criteria that are extremely flexible and subjective
and therefore provide ample room for political "favoritism" or "retalia-
tion" if the decisionmakers allowed themselves to be subjected to im-
proper pressure and considerations.
One important safeguard against such abuses lies in the fact that
Commission decisions are not made by a single individual but, rather,
12. 2 E. BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE GOLDEN
WEB 170 (1968).
13. 6 Fed. Reg. 3302 (1941).
14. 9 Fed. Reg. 702 (1944). White House pressures concerning this matter may have continued
even after Chairman Fly departed from the Commission. Fly's successor, Paul Porter, reported later
that Roosevelt "was constantly leaning on me to get the newspapers out of broadcasting." H. ASH-
MORE, FEAR IN THE AIR 114 (1973). However, in light of "Roosevelt's failing health and the lim-
ited time FDR was alive while Porter was chairman," Professor Powe has expressed doubt
concerning the accuracy of Porter's recollection. L. PoWE, supra note 10, at 264 n.18.
15. There have been allegations that, during earlier administrations, commissioners themselves
may have been motivated by improper political considerations. See, eg., Schwartz, Comparative
Television and the Chancellor's Foot, 47 GEo. L.J. 655, 690-93 (1959) (asserting that the FCC in the
1950s had a marked tendency to award licenses in comparative television proceedings to newspapers
that had supported Eisenhower in the 1952 election while denying the applications of those that had
supported Adlai Stevenson).
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require a majority of a five-member panel. Such collegial decisionmaking
undoubtedly helps to minimize the incidence of improper communica-
tions from politicians and to reduce the likelihood that such communica-
tions would be successful in achieving their purposes. However, so long
as the FCC is given such extensive powers over the operations of the
media and such broad discretion in its decisionmaking, our only sure
protection is in the selection of men and women of genuine character and
integrity to serve on the Commission.
As indicated, I am confident that the Commissioners who have
served during at least the last two decades have maintained these high
standards. However, while I am optimistic that this will continue to be
the case in the future, one must question the soundness of a system that is
so heavily dependent on the quality of individual political appointments.
